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ABSTRACf
FiVt! types ofdeperJOtwliullion experiences baset! Ort swks developed
b)'Jacobs and Bovasso (/992) were used 10 cluster subjects into six
groIlJ)s. Four relatively small groups which had regular depersoT/al-
iUllion experiences were ideNtified: the Derealiud, the Self-negaling,
tIll! B{J(ly-detor.hed, and the Profoundly Depersonalized. The fifth
grou!), the Fleetingly Depersonaliud, and the sixth group, the Non-
dejJmOtwliuxl, constituled 25 %and 50% ofthe!JOpuwtioll, respec-
tivPly. A !,rofile rmal)'sis indicated qua!ilatilie differences between
the six groups in their pathological traits, which fell along a con-
ti/UIlIIIl ofpallwlof:,rical sroerity. nit: results support the validity of
(I mullitlimensionol de!IerSOIwliullion constmct which may clarify
some of lhe contr(/(/ictions and inconsistencies in the literature on
depersonalization. Further, the results tn<l)'facilitate clinicians' dif
feren liation oftheir!mtients olonga continuulll ofl)(jlhological sever-
ity based on lhe lype and frequenC)' ofdepersonaliwlio1l experiences
which thl:)' rejNrl.
The concept ofdepersonalization has been widely spec-
ulated upon by clinicians, but has remained LHlder-
researched despite the surge of attention to various forms
of dissocialion, such as multiple personality disorder (Spiegel,
1993; Singer &SincolT, 1990). The definition ofthe conSU'uCl
of depersonaliztltion and the con'eel idemification of the
~ymptomsof depersonalization have been a source of con-
trovcrs}' in psychiatry (Le\)' & Wachtel, 1978; Mellor, 1988).
In the last decade a number of measures (Bernstein &
PUlnam, 1986; Frischholz, el al. 1990; Frischholz, Braun, &
Sahes, 1991; Kirby, 1990; Sanders, 1986; Steinberg, 1991)
studying diverse forms of dissociation such as psychogenic
fugue, amnesia, auditory hallucinalions, and multiple per-
sonality disorder have been established. The absence of
cmpiricallysound instruments that mcasure different forms
of depersonalization may account for inconsistent findings
regarding its symptoms, incidence and prevalence, and its
association with other forms of psychopathology.
Jacobs and Bovasso (1992) found empirical evidence to
support a multidimensional construct of depersonalization
dilTerenlialcd by mild self-ob5Clyd\ion on one end ofthc con-
tinuum and psychotic states on the other. Their findings sug-
gest that an array ofsymptoms has been attributed to deper-
sonalization because the constrUCt is lTlultidimensional
(Mellor, 1988). These depersonalization symptoms have been
attributed to disorders such as depression (Tucker, Harrow,
& Quinlan, 1973) and anxiety (Oberdorf, 1950), as well as
to non-pathological phenomena, such as therapeulic change
(Kelly, 1955), and adjuslment to new social roles (Levy &
Wachtel, 1976). The empirical dnelopmctll of a multidi-
mensional construct may resolve the ambiguity surrounding
the construcl of depersonalization and ilS confusion with
otller constructs. Tllis rnultidimensiOilal construct involves
an expansion of the slandard ps}'chiatric concept of deper-
sonalization.
In the lttultidilllcnsior131 model, thc principal form of
depersonalization, II/oulhenticity, involves a loss of a sense of
genuineness abom one's behavior reflected in the need to
cOTltinuously remind oneself of onc's actions. A second SCt
of s}'mptoms which had been long regarded as a form of
depersonalization, DerealiUltiol/, involves a loss offamiliariry
with friends or surroundings. A third typc of dcpersonal-
izatioll, Bod)' detachment, involves pcrceptions of lhe body as
distorted or delached, and is commonly rcported in psy-
chiatric populations. A fourth t}l)C, Self-negation involvcs thc
reluclance 10 acknowledge that oneselfis imulved in orcxpe-
riencing a particular situation, emOlion or cognition. The
fifth, Self-objectification, involves a gross disorientation in thc
external world and the expericnce of the selfas numb, dead
or inanimate.
Thc lncasuremcntof thesc fivc depcrsonalization dimen-
sions facilitates the developme11l of a typology of deperson-
alization experiences which may be used to classify individ~
ual cascs. Certain individuals may experience one or more
forms of depersonalization while they do nOI, or less fre-
quently experience other forms. Further, individuals c1assi-
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Mean Depersonalization Scale Score*
Measures
The five depersonalization scales (Jacobs & Bovasso,
1992) each consisted of five items. Subjects rated the fre-
quency of the occurrence of the expelience expressed in each
item, as follows: 0) never, I) yearly, at least once a year, 2)
monthly, at least once a montll, 3) weekly, at least once a
week, or 4) daily, at least once a day. Data from 11 of the 232
subjects who responded to a Depersonalization item that mea-
sured careless or random responses were not used in tlle anal-
ysis. The Depersonalization scale was group-administered;
the researcher read instructions to the subjects and remained
in the room to answer any questions about the form.
Ten scales from the Differential Personality Inventory,
or DPI (Jackson & Messick, 1973) were used to assess patho-
logical traits associated with depersonalization. The DPl has
internal consistency and convergent and discriminant valid-
ity (Jackson & Carlson, 1973), and has also been validated


















The subjects were 232 students from a large nortlleast-
ern university. They were approximately 75% women, with
a median age of lwen ty-two.
the literature as combining a loss of
authenticity and self-negation (Myers
& Grant, 1972; Torch, 1978). These
individuals have difficulties in
acknowledging and experiencing
emotions and cognition which violate
their self-expectations. A fourth type
ofdepersonalized individual is evere-
ly dissociated, and therefore reports
high levels of several dimensions of
depersonalization, particularly Self-
objectification, which is the most
pathological depersonalization expe-
rience. Self-objectification is experi-
enced in only a small proportion of the
population and is associated wi th
severe personality disorders (Munich,
1978). The authors also expect two
additional types ofdepersonalization:
the Fleetingly Depersonalized and the
Non-depersonalized. Individuals who
only fleetingly experience deperson-
alization have been frequently noted
in the research literature (Eliot,
Rosenberg, & Wagner, 1984), and a
substantial body of the general popu-
lation reports no experiences of
depersonalization (Nemiah, 1976).
TABLE 1
Depersonaliztion Groups Resulting from Cluster Analysis
Cluster 1 2 3 4
on-depersonalized .19 .59 .15 .29
Fleetingly Depersonalization .88 1.08 .54 .88
Derealized .47 2.16 .42 .87
Self-negating 1.56 2.04 .59 2.04
Body Detachment 2.50 2.04 1.22 .98
Profoundly Depersonalized 2.47 2.50 2.20 2.70
All Subjects .70 1.10 .44 .75
* 1) Body Detachment; 2) Derealization; 3) Self-objectification;
4) Self-negation; 5) Inauthenticity.
** Percentages do not sum to 100 due to munding.
fied Witll different types of depersonalization may differ in
the severity of more general patllOlogical traits. The authors
hypothesize that six depersonalization groups will best
describe the population sampled. These groups will expeli-
ence qualitatively different depersonalization experiences
which will be also differentiated by levels of general psy-
chopathology.
Derealization is commonly found in mildly and severe-
ly dissociated individuals in both clinical and non·dinical pop-
ulations (Eliot, Rosenberg, & Wagner 1984; Ross, Joshi, &
Currie, 1990; Sanders, McRoberts, & Tollefson, 1989;
Trueman, 1984). Although derealization and depersonal-
ization are currently regarded as independent, derealization
experience are frequently presented by individuals suffer-
ing depersonalization disorder. 1 onetheless, tlle indepen-
del1Ce of the depersonalization and derealization constructs
has been supported in previous research (Fleiss, Gurland,
& Goldberg, 1975). Thus, the autllOrs expect to find a clus-
ter of individuals who expelience derealization exclusively,
as well as clusters tllat experience bOtll derealization and
depersonalization. The literature (Jacobson, 1971; Nueller,
1982; Tucker, Harrow, & Quinlan, 1973) also suggests anotll-
er distinct type of depersonalization experience involving
Body-<letachment. This type of individual frequently expe-
riences estrangement from the body, as well as general dere-
alization.
A third type of depersonalized individual is depicted in
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The DPI measures the same general
domain of ps)'chopatholob'1' as the
Minneapolis Multiphasic Pcrsonalil)'
Invelltor)'. or MMPI Uad.son &
HolTman. 1987). The I)PI \\~.tS select-
ed for the presellt simi)' because irs
<;cales specificall)' measure phenome-
na most cOllllHanl)' reponed to be
associated with dcpcrsonaliz:llion. par-
ticularly general feelings of unreality.
The ten OPt scalessclcclt..'<1 for the
study measured Broodiness. Dcpres-




tion. Self Depredation. and Shallaw-
!leSSOrArre(;l. Forcach subject. a lotal
«,core on each DI'I scale ....-as calculat-
ed b.~scd on [me/false responses to
each item. In addition, the IWI in-
frequency and Defensiveness scales
were used to check the validit), of lhe
responses. Dcfensi'"CllcsS meaSllres
the tendency nOllO endorse items lhat
~He low in social desirabilit),. In-
frequency measures random or care-
less respondillg, Onl)' 15 subjecl.S
endorsed one of the 1I\"c DPI In-
frequenc), scale itcl11s, which was
common in 50% or fcwcr of the sub-
jt'CL" in the Ol'l's normativc sample"
None of the sllbjccL" here Clldorsed
more lhan unc of thc Infrequenc)'
itt.:ms. TIlliS, lhe 01'1 responses wcre
\~llid, and no subjects wcrc eliminat-
ed from Llle analysis.
Using Ward's method of hier~u·­
chical clusler analysis, subjects were
categorized into six groups based 011
lheir responses 10 the five depcrson-
aliL<llion scales (Sec Table I). The six-
du<;ter solution was chosen on an a pri-
ori basis. A I>osl-hoc examination ofall
SOlutions resulting in fewer than six
CIU<;lcrsconlirmcd tll;lIlhe six cluster
'Kllution llIaximilcd qualitati\'e differ-
("Ilces in depersonalization among lhe
dusters.
iiI
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The first depersonalization group contained the Derealized,
who experienced Derealization on a monthly basis, but no
other form ofdepersonalization. The second group consisted
of the Self-negating, who regularly experience both Self-nega-
tion and Derealization, and to a lesser extent Body-detach-
ment. The third group consisted of the Body-detached, who
regularly experienced Body Detachment and Derealization,
but only infrequently experienced the other types of deper-
sonalization. The fourth group consisted of the Profoundly
Depersonalized, who regularly experienced all forms ofdeper-
sonalization. They were the only group to experience regu-
lar Inauthenticityand Self-objectification, the latter ofwhich
is the most pathological form of depersonalization. The
Fleetingly Depersonalized and Non-depersonalized groups also
emerged as predicted. These latter two groups consisted of
25% and 50% of the sample, respectively. The existence and
prevalence of the Fleetingly Depersonalized and a Non-
depersonalized group was expected in a non-clinical popu-
lation and is consistent with the literature (Nemiah, 1976).
A profile analysis was conducted to test whether tlle clus-
ters differed in their profiles on more general traits associ-
ated with pathology, as measured by the DP! scales. To test
tllis hypothesis, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANO-
VA) was performed using the DP! scales as repeated measures
of the within-subjects factor, general pathology, and the
depersonalization clusters as levels of the between-subjects
factor, depersonalization. As expected a significant multi-
variate interaction was found between depersonalization and
general pathology, £(45, 1182)~3.1,12<.0001. All univariate
tests of interaction effects were also significant, except for
two. The depersonalization clusters failed to significantly dif-
fer in the degree to which their members reported a) unequal
levels ofNeurotic Disorganization and Perceptual Distortion
and b) unequal levels of Depression and Desocialization.
Overall, the subjects in the depersonalization clusters had
significantly different profiles on the DP! scales (See Figures
1 and 2). The Non-depersonalized subjects had DP! scores
below average on all DP! scales, except for Familial Discord,
which was average. The Fleetingly Depersonalized had DP!
scores which were in tlle average range, except for Feelings
of Unreality, Mood Fluctuation, and Perceptual Distortion,
which were slightly above average. The Derealized had
slight elevations on the DP! scales, except for Desocialization
and Familial Discord, which were slightly below average, and
Feelings of nrealityand Mood Fluctuation scales which were
somewhat above average. The Self-negating scored above
average on the Feelings of Unreality scale, and to a lesser
exten t scored above average on the Broodines.s and
Desocialization scales. Otherwise, the Self-ne~atinghad DP!
scores which were only somewhat above average, and in a
range similar to the scores by the Derealized and Fleetingly
Depersonalized. In contrast, the Profoundly Depersonalized
had exceptionally high elevations on nearly all the DP! scales,
except DesociaIization and Familial Discord. Similarly, the
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Body-detached had substantial elevations on most of the DP!
scales, including Desocialization, but not Familial Discord.
DISCUSSION
Five of the six groups matched the authors' predictions
regarding tlle clustering of depersonalization symptoms,
whereas expectations for the Self-negating group were only
partially confirmed. The Self-negating group was expected
to report regular experiences of Inauthenticity, which was
not the case. Inauthenticity experiences were not regularly
experienced by any depersonalization group, except tlle
Profoundly Depersonalized. Inauthenticity, which pertains
to experiences of the self as not genuine, may be associated
,,~th pathological experiences, but only in a small portion
of the population. Although occasional loss ofgenuineness
may be common, persistent experiences of this type appear
to be associated with relatively severe character pathologies.
Derealization is common to several groups regularly
experiencing various forms of depersonalization, and is the
most commonly expel;enced form ofdepersonalization, and
possibly an early symptom of the dissociation process.
Individuals in the Derealized group, who only experience
Derealization, experience low levels of dissociation, as mea-
sured by tlle DP! Feelings ofUnreality scale, whereas the Body-
detached and the Self-negating report symptoms of deper-
sonalization which reflect moderate levels ofdissociation. The
Derealized do not regularly experience symptoms associat-
ed with the moderately dissociated groups, the Self-negat-
ing and the Body-detached. These two moderately dissoci-
ated groups have qualitatively distinct depersonalization
experiences from each oilier. The Body-detached experience
tlleir physique as unfamiliar, detached or not belonging to
iliem. The Self-negating experience alienation from emo-
tions, ilioughts or situations which they recognize but try not
to acknowledge because they are ego-dystonic. Thus, the
Body-detached group's distress is caused by a diminished or
lost relation to their body, whereas the Self-negating group's
distress is caused by a lost recognition ofcertain experiences.
The more general traits of the Body-detached and Self-
negating clusters also differ. Although similar in their brood-
iness, desocialization and sense of unreality, the Body-
detached tend to be more depressed, more disorganized in
their thoughts and feelings, and more given to perceptual
distortions and self-deprecation than the Self-negating.
Aliliough the self-negated are moderately disturbed, tlleir
dissociation stems largely from not wanting to acknowledge
ego-dystonic events in the external world. The body
detached's depersonalization is internalized wherein fun-
damental aspects of themselves (i.e., their body) are expe-
rienced as unreal. Body-detached experiences have long been
associated wiili strong mood disorders, particularly depres-
sive disorders Uacobson, 1959) whereas Self-negating expe-
riences are associated wiili youiliful expectations ofilie world
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which have gOlle unfilled (W<lgner & Tnu::man, 1984). The
Body-<Ictached's depression might account for their c1c\<tt-
cd scores on self-depreciation and thought disorganization.
Deprt:s.sion has long been associated \\;th negath'e and palho-
logical self-images as well as diflicuhy in ororanizing think-
ing and acting cfTecti\·e1y.
The Profoundly Depersonalized have the highest Ic\'cl.~
of dissociation, ;Ind experience all forms of depersonaliza-
tion, most notabl)' Self-objectilicatioll which docs not occur
regularly in any ofl..he other t}l>es. These individuals mal' be
O\'erwhelmed b)' thcirdissociativeexpcriencesand ma)' ha\'c
lost familiarity \,·jlh theil' bodies. cognition. elllotions and
the cXlcmal world. This impairmclll of reality testing is a
fundamental feaUlre ofllorderline PersonalilY Disorder, and
the symptoms as.~ociated with Profound Depcrsonali7.:11ion
have bcen related to Borderline Personality Disorder
(Chopra & BcaLWn, 1986; Gunderson. Kolb, & Austin. 1981,
Munich, 1978). The rrofoundly Depersonali7.crl are rel:nivel}'
high in thought disorganization, as \\'ell as neurotic disor-
g.:miz:lIion, the tendency to be inefficient and indTcctivc in
the completion of rominc tasks. These traiL~,which arc char-
acteristics of the Profoundly Dcpcrsonalized, and to a less-
erextent the Bod}'-dctached, ma)' be severe enough to ilnpair
the ordinary functioning which most indi\'iduals take for
gr.tnted. In the Profoundly Depersonalized and the Body-
detached, social and occupational competence may be low-
ered. These indh'iduals rna)' have dinicult)' al.lending t,o rel-
evantdctails, and theirelnotionsoftcn ovcrpower thcirability
to think and act cOcnivcly. Tucker et a1. (1973) noted that
severe depersonalization was associated with high levels of
disorg;:mi'led thinking, but that moderate and mild deper-
!tOnalization ....<15 not necessarily associated with disorganil.ed
thinking. Thus, the perceptions of the Profoundly
Depcrsonalized indh'idllal may nOI bc reliable and he or she
lIlay be grosslydisorientcd in the external world. The break-
down of allention and reasoning capacities has been asso-
ciated with an implosion ofaversivc emotions. This gross dis-
orientation allows lhe indh'idual to doubt the dislurbing
reality and in turn, 10 defend againsl the avcrsive emotions
associalCd with il (r-,'Iunich, 1978; Nores & Klelli, 1977).
Depression, which has been consisl,cntly associated with
depcrsonalization Uacobsoll. 1964; Neullcr, 1982; Tucker
el al., 1973) characterizes only the Profollndly Depersonal-
ized and the BodY"detached, arguing thai only severely deper-
sonalized individuals manifest persislent depressi\·e cogni-
tion and affcct. TIle consistency with which dcpression and
dissociation are associated in the literalUre raises the possi-
bility that their presence is interactive; one may intensify the
other. The distorted cognition and feelings which are char-
acteristicofdepression may result in perceptionsof the world.
the self, and the body asstr.l.nge and unfamiliar. In turn, the
consistent presence of depersonalizalion is likcl}' to make
the individual morc disu·csscd and depressed.
Similarly, self-deprcciation also dislinguishes lhe
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Profollndly Depcrsonalized and the Body-detached from the
Fleetingly Depersonalized, Derealized and Self-negating
I)'I>CS. TheJackson and Messick (1972) scale for Sclf-dcpre-
dation consists of apprais..'tls of the self as worthless, unlov-
able, and dcscl"\'ing ofrejcction. This self-cffaccment 1»' the
Profoundly Depersonalized indhiduals adds support to the
inferencc that these individuals are defending Ihemselves
againstlnore illlensc Ih reats 10 identity Ihan the other dcper-
sonalized types. Se\'Cre depersonalizalion has been associ-
atcd ,\'ith the dC"c1opmenlal impainnem ofidentit)' and gross
identity diffusion characteristic of Borderline Personality
Disorder. Other phenomena associalCd \\'ith acute deper-
sonalizalion, such as life threatening trauma and sexual
abuse, obviously I hreaten self:Concept and llsllally have neg-
ative affcclS on sell~\'dlualiorls.
The faCior which mOSI distinguishes the Body-detached
from the Pl'Ofoundly Depersonalized is Desocialization,
prob3blydue to the profoundly depersonalized being so cog-
niti\'e1y disorganized that their social competcnce is ncga-
tively affected. Thc)' pl'Obably lack both confidence and cog-
nitivc skills to pcrform well in social siUlations. This group
is clearly the most pathological of the depersonalized types.
The high scores of the Profoundly Depersonalized on
thoughtclisorganiz.'ttion suggcslthat this group has the great-
est difficulty with organizing and acting upon information.
This is reflected in profound states of depersonalization
wherc thl.'y blur such fundamental perceplions ofselfas being
alive or distinguishing the self from the extcrnal world.
Broodinessgcllcr:lll)'distinguishes the three mostdeper-
sonalized clusters from the threc least depersonalized elliS-
ters.Jackson and Messick (1972) define their Broodinessscale
as measuring an intense suspicion ofothers' llJoti\'ations, cau-
tion about making personal disclosure and a tendcncy
to\\~.trd paranoid idcation. These individuals search realil)'
for information to just ify their persecutory ideation. although
they probably havc only vague ideas of others' motivations.
Secondly, their constant and intense examination of the
moti\'csorothers might make it more difficult to experience
others as genuine or situations as rdatively straightfom-ard
and not deceptive. For the brood)' indi\'idual, depersonal-
ization may be fadlitat,ed by selectively perceiving informa-
tion which docs not confirm their vague suspicions as unn,:-
al. Other information supporting their \'iew of the world as
hostile and persecutory is probably 50 .wersivc that it isexpe-
riencecl as unreal. These indi\'idllals ,Ire in a double-bind;
non-threatening perceptions \'iolatc their suspicions and
seem unreal while threats to self and idelltity become
unreal becallsc thcy are frighlening.
[n the groups displaring mild and moderate levels of
del>crsonalizatioll, intact intellectual perceptions may lack
accompanying emotions. These thrcegrollps, the Fleetingly
Depersonalized, Dcrealizcd and Self-negating may be
emplo}ing depcrsonaliz.'ttion to defend against rdatively less
threalening stimuli than individuals classified in the more
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severely depersonalized clusters. Eliot et al. (1984) note that
the Fleetingly Depersonalized were defending against vio-
lated self-expectations. Levy and Wachtel (1978) attributed
the anxiety of these individuals to role strain and Roberts
(1960) and Torch (1978) attributed it to changes in famil-
iar objects. These experiences violate expectations, but are
not severe enough to override intellectual functions and per-
ceptions. Torch (1978) and Levy and Wachtel (1976) note
that certain derealized subjects may over-intellectualize and
be hypervigilant toward reality, becoming emotionally
detached from jarring events. In contrast, the reactions of
Profoundly Depersonalized individuals have been associat-
ed with life-threatening trauma (Kletti, 1976), sexual abuse
(Steinberg, 1991), suicidal impulses (Munich, 1978), and in
a diffusion or loss offundamental aspects of identity (Chopra
& Beatson, 1986; Gunderson et aI., 1981).
Although these results should be approached with cau-
tion, a vivid pattern emerges which suggests that deperson-
alization may be indicative of overall level of psychopathol-
ogy. Individuals who report certain types ofdepersonalization
have higher levels of pathology than individuals who report
other types of depersonalization. The failure to differenti-
ate these distinct types ofdepersonalization may result in the
misclassification of individuals with varying levels of overall
psychopathology. In assessing individuals for psychopathol-
ogy, consideration of the distinct types of depersonalization
reported by an individual may provide an expedient index
of their overall level of pathology.•
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